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Abstract 
Biosecurity poses the problem of how to live with and manage the complex, 
contingent and emergent circulations of life. This excess of circulating life 
manifests in a host of different circumstances: from the biopolitical attempt to 
sort ‘good’ from ‘bad’ circulations disrupted by a zoonotic virus making use of air 
transportation networks; to fluid microbial topologies that challenge the 
bounded individual body; from a biosurveillance network signal prompting 
anticipatory governance responses; to the intersection of financial and microbial 
geographies in the risky practices of industrial agribusiness. The ‘shock of the 
real’ from these eventful and everyday occurrences not only illuminates 
empirical connections between circulating bodies, microbes, knowledges, 
electronic signals, seeds, capital, food and anxiety, but also highlights that the 
complexity of securing processes that are elaborating new forms of life cannot be 
fully captured through any one theoretical lens. In this review article I consider 
the burgeoning field of biosecurity studies through attention to these differing 
concepts of circulation, and suggest neglected circulations for future research. 
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economy. 
Introduction 
“[W]e want a world in which people are as free as possible to travel and to 
exchange goods and ideas, but … we need a world in which most other living things 
stay put ”,  the environmentalist Chris Bright espoused (1999, 200). Biosecurity 
is popularly imagined and frequently experienced as the practical enforcement 
of that need – as the strict imposition of territorial integrity; of enclosures, 
borders and boundaries separating the safe inside from the dangerous 
circulatory currents outside; of separation, containment and purification 
(Hinchliffe, 2013).  Teams of biosecurity officers armed with x-ray machines and 
sniffer dogs policing national borders with lists of the permitted and not 
permitted; automated barn doors designed to keep cows in and badgers out.  
Despite the potency of this understanding of biosecurity as a rigid bordering 
logic, social science explorations of biosecurity as a form of spatialised 
environmental governance quickly dovetailed with diverse understandings of 
mobility and circulation. Travelling across disciplines, trespassing 
epistemological boundaries, concepts of circulation capture both accelerated life 
processes, but also the production of capital, information and power. Here I 
utilise it as a heuristic device – a way of drawing together different theoretical 
strands and empirical concerns in the issue complex of biosecurity. By 
disentangling four different modes of circulation – trade and travel, viruses, 
information and capital - overlapped by alternative theoretical conceptions of 
circulation, I hope to demonstrate the capacity of biosecurity as fertile empirical 
ground for theoretical development. 
Biopolitical circulations: Facilitation; Acceleration; Cessation 
Influential earlier work on constructions of disease, native/non-native species 
and national natural identity were strongly inflected with Foucauldian concerns 
over space, power and categorisation. The specific mining of the issue of 
biopolitical circulation following the publication in English of Foucault’s Security, 
Territory, Population in 2007, however, has led to a wealth of insights into the 
relationship between biosecurity and the facilitation of life (Foucault, 2007). 
From simply arresting circulation through the categorisation, demarcation and 
protection of territory, biosecurity came to be understood as a practice 
concerned with its facilitation and optimization (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 
2009, 11; Foucault, 2007). Rather than in conflict with global trade, travel and 
contemporary neoliberal life more broadly through the imposition of 
import/export requirements, bag searching and other movement impediments, 
biosecurity instead emerges as a practice that facilitates these flows, by 
attempting to remove their risky or negative elements (Adey, 2004). In the 
context of WTO trade disputes, biosecurity arrangements operate as a badge of 
assurance for market penetration, a guard against the arbitrary imposition of 
trade barriers (Maye et. al. 2012; Potter, 2013). Law and Mol (2008) offer a 
further example in their exploration of the material politics of boiling pigswill, 
when they argue that biosecurity bordering practices operate by allowing 
circulation in such a way that maintains differences either side of a boundary – 
between diseased and disease free, but significantly also between rich and poor 
regions. Trade and financial circulations, they demonstrate, occur not simply in 
spite of these boundaries and the differentials they support – but are facilitated 
by these differentials. Circulation is an outcome of biosecurity. 
One particular quote resonates through this work, where Foucault describes 
biopolitical governmentality as -  
 ‘a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, 
making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the 
good circulation by diminishing the bad’ (Foucault, 2007:18). 
The difficulty for biosecurity practice is that this involves separating 
consequential flows. The same conduits opened up, promoted, sustained, 
invested in for the facilitation of ‘good’ circulations provides opportunities –
conceptualized in the biosecurity lexicon as ‘pathways’ - for ‘bad’ circulations, to 
which they are tightly coupled (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). As tourists 
travel with viruses, goods with invasive species, animals with infectious 
microbes, food with contaminates; these things emerge as the dark side of 
globalisation: a direct result of the active incitement of circulations (Budd and 
Warren, 2011). Securing the contingent freedom of circulations necessary for the 
flourishing of a particular form of neoliberal life moves beyond a sorting of the 
‘good’ from the ‘bad’ (Anderson, 2012; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). 
Biosecurity must negotiate a balance between too much and too little regulation, 
as in the spaces where it operates it is not the only concern, competing with a 
manifold of circulations, driven by different forces - the need to produce and 
distribute good, cheap food; the reproduction of natural identities; the 
reinforcement of family ties; the sustaining of economies (Bingham and Lavau, 
2012; Barker, 2010). These flows cannot be simply halted or suppressed if 
liberal life is to survive and flourish. Identifying risky movements and 
determining the appropriate level of intervention involves an industry of risk 
assessments and profiling, cost benefit analysis and bio-economic modelling 
(Mumford, 2013). Finding the right balance between regulating or temporarily 
halting circulations to preserve and protect circulations is not easy. For the 2001 
Foot and Mouth Disease response in the UK, the ‘closure of the countryside’ has 
been criticised for the huge financial losses within the tourist industry; for the 
2009 response to H1N1 the closure of schools and the mass prophylactic 
administration of Tamiflu brought costs, risks and disruptions outweighing those 
wrought by the virus itself (Barker, 2012; Chambers et al 2012). 
It is not simply circulations with negative side effects that draw a security 
response, but those with the potential for perpetual escalation, such as infectious 
disease (Elbe, 2009).  A threatening circulatory crisis, as Beck’s work on the risk 
society shows us, undermines normal risk management, avoids containment 
within acceptable limits, and is marked by its widespread disruptive influence 
(Elbe, 2009; Beck, 1992). It is the potential for these circulatory threats to 
drastically reduce or cease other circulatory flows, of people, goods, transport, of 
(heaven forbid) the ‘perpetuum mobile of circulation’ which defines capitalism, 
that invites the security response (Marx, 1976). This insight underpins a vein of 
research within biosecurity studies into ‘vital systems security’ and the logic of 
preparedness (Anderson, 2010; Lakoff and Collier, 2008), in which the focus of 
security is on arrangements for maintaining or rapidly rehabilitating vital 
infrastructures of circulation (information, finance, power, water) after a 
generalized insecurity ‘event’.  
For Hinchliffe et al (2013), however, this sorting and securing of circulations as 
part of the facilitation of neoliberal life through biosecurity practices remains a 
‘will to closure’. Underpinned by a bordering spatial logic of disease as an 
external threat, the success of these practices, they argue, is measured by their 
ability to limit the flow – incursion or invasion - of fully formed unwanted 
organisms from ‘over there’ to ‘here’ across territorial space. Desired circulations 
become ‘walled in’ through attempts to enclose them in disease-free conduits, 
while the role of industrial agriculture in producing the conditions for disease 
are neglected. While this implies excess attention within both biosecurity 
accounts and practice into the distribution of disease over its production, any 
easily made distinction between disease emergence and distribution has been 
challenged through explorations into the productive potential of circulation, as 
the following section reviews. 
Microbial geographies: Molecularisation; Emergence; Association 
Foucauldian analyses of biopolitical circulations incorporate attention to 
nonhumans, material ‘liveliness’ and the non-discursive realm (Philo, 2012). To 
fully capture biosecurity as a key biopolitical domain of the present, however, 
further theoretical resources have been drawn on to consider how life is 
characterized and constituted through circulation. In particular, understandings 
of life as molecular; as emergent, vital and multiple; and as formed through or 
comprised of associations, composites and assemblages, have made important 
contributions to our understandings of biosecurity realms.  
Nicolas Rose, amongst others, has advanced the thesis of contemporary life as 
‘molecularized’ (Rose, 2007). Through the reorganization of the gaze of the life 
sciences the human body was imagined as sub-cellular processes and events. As 
a predominant imagination structuring who we are, this molecular body has 
become subject to a host of pastoral expert knowledges and self-management– 
thus engendering forms of somatic individuality (Rose, 2007; Novas, 2000). In 
biosecurity literatures this image of a self-contained molecular ‘human’ body has 
been replaced by that of a shifting, collegial (or not so collegial) inter and intra-
active assemblage of associated organisms (Haraway, 2008; Hird, 2010). 
Through biosecurity concerns our porous and sticky composite body has been 
politicized for its potential to enable the mobility of unwanted entities – taking 
us from forms of somatic to symbiotic individuality (Barker, 2010). When 
coupled with an understanding of modern life – particularly cities – as 
networked spaces, this vulnerable geopolitical body embedded in chaotic and 
unpredictable molecular contexts becomes less a personal project than a 
potential global pathway (Ali and Keil, 2008; Braun, 2007).  
Biosecurity theorists have drawn this engagement with mobile life at the 
molecular level together with concern over the mutability of viruses in expert 
discourses, into conversation with work on immanence, emergence, vitality and 
contingency (Braun, 2008; Deleuze, 2004 [1980]; De Landa, 1999). Life becomes 
characterized by its inherent mutability and multiplicity, by the ‘excess of being 
over classified and calculated being’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009, 8; Shaw et 
al., 2010). Alongside these manifold possible disease futures contained within 
the present, further fracturing and multiplication occurs through the practices 
that attempt to make viruses knowable. A significant theme within the 
biosecurity literature, indebted to Annemarie Mol’s empirical philosophy, 
explores different knowledges about disease not as competing perspectives on 
the same thing, but as multiple enactments, multiple realities produced through 
the intersection of materials, knowledges and practices (Mol, 2002; see Law and 
Mol, 2008; Enticott, 2008, Mather and Marshall, 2011). Crucially, however, 
nonhumans have been shown to be mobile, mutable, emergent – and hence 
uncertain – not just through their dealings with humans, but through life’s own 
productive capacities (Clark, 2002; Clark, 2003). 
In the context of biosecurity concerns, emergence is intimately related firstly to 
mobility – as viruses circulate, drifting, mutating, evolving and re-assorting - 
rendering circulation a life-producing force. As they travel through populations, 
influenza viruses from pigs, sheep and humans meet, mix, mingle and join forces. 
Through small adaptations viral barriers between species are broken down, or 
prions replicate and multiply - in defiance of established science (see Hinchliffe 
2001 for an extended discussion of BSE; Hinchliffe, 2013). Secondly and 
following on, emergence is a function of connectivity or association – with 
disease increasingly understood as a co-evolutionary or relational achievement 
(Hinchliffe, 2013; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). Through this continuous 
mixing or enmeshing – of bodies, environments, hosts, viruses – opportunities 
for new life occur as divisions are circumvented. For the management of 
infectious disease, the mobility, motility and associative potential of life leads to 
the ongoing production of new diseases; the potential for shifts in the 
transmissibility and virulence of existing disease; and the possibility that viruses 
will achieve the capacity to cross species barriers. For Hinchliffe et al (2013), the 
implication of disease emergence as a relational or associative achievement 
enabled through industrial agricultural environments has not been fully 
accounted for. Building on Enticott’s (2012) work on disease expression which 
challenges disease presence or absence as the distinction between healthy and 
unhealthy bodies or spaces, they argue:  ‘Being healthy may not simply mean 
being free from pathogens, but a matter of immunocompetence; that is, the ability 
to live with a variety of other organisms that are always in circulation’ (Hinchliffe 
et al 2013, 7). They argue that it is the intensity of relations that compose space 
rather than movement along a network through which disease gains its 
effectiveness. While circulation and association can be seen as co-constituting 
elements of disease emergence, the metaphor of overflowing intensities here, 
rather than the breakdown of boundaries over there, is a vital realignment of 
powerful biosecurity worldviews.1 
Biological life understood as emergent phenomena presents the continual 
possibility of producing new, unknown and unpredictable biological threats, 
which exposes biosecurity practice to the impossibility of full knowledge, and 
necessitates, it is argued, attention to nonspecific biological threats in a 
generalized context of emergency (Cooper, 2006). The capacity or success of 
biosecurity regulations and practice to incorporate a response to biological 
indeterminacy and radically open futures varies across biosecurity issue areas 
and regimes of practice. For zoonotic infectious disease - ‘naturally occurring’, 
accidental and nefarious - a range of anticipatory governance approaches to this 
indeterminate generalized threat (such as forms of precaution, preemption, 
                                                        
1 There are difficulties relating these insights to other contexts of biosecurity concern, where, for 
example immuno-incompetence is not a product of industrial human-animal relations but of 
geological-biological relations – the fragile island environment rather than the fragile chicken 
body. This points to a wider issue within the biosecurity literature. Just as Philips (2013) 
critiques the captivation of eventual over everyday biosecurities in our accounts, there exists a 
tendency to extend theoretical insights from one mode of biosecurity to a generalized biosecurity 
– with animal disease emergencies dominating understandings of what biosecurity is.  
preparedness) have been extensively detailed by biosecurity theorists 
(Anderson, 2010b; Anderson, 2010a; Braun, 2007).  
For invasive plants and plant diseases, the inherent unpredictability of relational 
life leaves national and international governing bodies and international trade 
agreements scrambling to keep up, and poses problems for risk assessments 
based on current observations – as good behaviour in one environment fails to 
guarantee docility in another – particularly in the context of climatic shifts. This 
is leading to pressure for ‘white lists’ of permitted plants and products over 
‘black lists’ of not permitted, which can permanently lag behind the 
inventiveness of life. A notable response in this sector has been the promotion of 
sterile hybrids and cultivars as alternatives to popular yet invasive garden plants 
within New Zealand’s ‘Plant Me Instead’ initiative – an example of the targeting 
of ever-earlier points of intervention in the emergence of pests. 
 
Biosurveillance and Informational Governance: Extension; Presence; Anticipation  
One key response to the emergent potential of epidemics and invasive events 
operates through a further circulatory current. Biosurveillance - the production, 
analysis and circulation of information on potential invasive events or epidemics 
- is a preeminent response to invasive threats, a growing area of public and 
private investment and a significant feature of national biosecurity regimes and 
international disease protocols.  
In Eugene Thacker’s terms disease surveillance networks are engaged in a real 
time battle between infection and communication, with surveillance networks 
contending dispersed emergent biological networks that achieve circulation 
across vulnerable bodies and highly connected nodes of transportation and 
transmission such as airports and hotels in globally networked cities (Thacker, 
2005; see also Ali and Keil, 2008). In an effort to replicate this indeterminate and 
inventive expansiveness, a host of different practices and technologies are drawn 
into the surveillance net, as epidemiology is mapped through ever more complex 
and immediate forms of infodemiology. Data on pharmaceutical sales, electronic 
information generated through internet use (Google searches, social media 
status updates or automatic searches of news stories), and even information on 
work absenteeism is being enrolled in the broader agenda of the security state, 
casting the medical/security gaze ever further (Parry, 2012; Eysenbach, 2002).  
Just as the disease ‘network’ is made up of technological, biological, human and 
non-human agencies, these surveillance networks are not just automated 
information exchanges but relational intra-actions of computers, information, 
hospitals, health professionals, x-ray machines, calipers, sniffer dogs, publics. 
This plethora of humans, nonhumans and technologies perform different 
practices - counting, photographing, reporting, sniffing, x-raying, measuring, 
swabbing, weighing, scanning, recording, collecting, sampling - through which 
biological markers (saliva, antibodies, a specimen of a pest) are transformed and 
circulated through these networks as information, ‘data doubles’ (Ericson, 
2000), informatic holograms. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2009) refer to the 
‘liquidification of ‘information’, as information is reduced to digital bites 
electronically, and molecular code biologically, which flow through systems of 
information exchange. This information can then be rematerialized in different 
forms (reports, publications) and reattached to a material referent (samples) 
(Latour, 1987). In this way occurrences of ill-health, disease or sightings of pests 
can be combined and transformed into forms that can be responded to 
politically. This begins to blur Thacker’s portrayal of biological networks on the 
one hand, and informational networks informing our understanding of these 
networks of life on the other. Instead, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero point to ‘a 
widespread account of life as informationalised, complex, adaptive and emergent’ 
(Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009, 6).  
These globally extensive informational processes attempt to make visible the 
specific topology of an infectious disease or invasive event – where it emerged, 
how it has traveled along different pathways. They are an attempt at 
calculability, at anticipating the oncoming epidemic, allowing time to put 
preparedness strategies into play (Adey and Anderson, 2012; Anderson, 2010a). 
They also function as systems of traceability, as a tool of recall and 
reconstruction (Bingham and Lavau, 2012). Their existence therefore anticipates 
biosecurity failure – embodying the discourse of ‘not if, but when’. This 
anticipatory framework could be argued to be generative of disease events, as 
this highly sensitized global surveillance infrastructure interacts with the 
underdeveloped capabilities of preparedness strategies to act in a reduced 
capacity in the event of mild pandemics (Barker, 2012).  
The International Health Regulations (IHR) requires states to notify about any 
event occurring in their territory that may constitute a ‘public health emergency 
of international concern’ (World Health Organization’s WHO, 2008:2). This 
necessitates monitoring possible signals of infectious disease, putting pressure 
on struggling public health services, diverting attention and funds. In addition, 
supposed ‘dual-use’ technologies involve the sharing – or co-opting - of public 
health surveillance networks for security concerns (Fearnley, 2008). The 
discourse of global health citizenship and the universal exchange of information 
belies the ways in which this tends to the whims of the rich rather than the needs 
of the poor (Ingram, 2005). 2 
The main aim of surveillance is to reduce the invisible presence of a virus or 
organism in a country, the period of ‘silent spread’ prior to detection. 
Intervening earlier is more cost effective and has a greater likelihood of success. 
But we also need to attend to the political and economic work these networks 
perform in producing and stabilising a visible absence. This entails proving you 
don’t have certain pests or diseases – such as foot and mouth in your national 
herd or fireblight in your exported apples - in order to participate in global trade, 
prove compliance to WTO standards, open up and maintain market access, and 
generate confidence for tourism (Higgins and Dibden, 2011; Law, 2006; Maye et 
al., 2012). The visualization of absence involves information management and 
circulation through continual report writing and publishing in a variety of 
formats. Every moment of surveillance, every report of a sighting, every ‘false 
positive’, becomes a possible disruptive presence that requires intensive work to 
stabilize as an absence (Froud et al., 2008). This requires continual reproduction, 
as surveillance practices and the surveillance architecture need to be made 
visible to succeed in securing international trust. This constructs a general global 
                                                        
2 The extent to which the One Health Movement – which seeks to link research and policy 
initiatives in the securing of animal and public health – replicates this co-opting of resources 
through the privileging of concerns about zoonosis and contagion over more mundane yet lethal 
health issues has yet to be subjected to significant research (but see Hinchliffe 2013b).  
state of insecurity, to the disadvantage of those countries where proof of absence 
is too expensive to achieve. Information and its circulation, not just conditions of 
knowledge such as uncertainty/indeterminacy, is therefore a driving force of 
biosecurity management. 
 
Commodifying life: Surface; Intensification; Scale  
The final form of circulation and area of theoretical attention I will consider 
attends to the question of how globalization processes and global financial 
circulations impact upon biosecurity agendas in the interdependency of 
economic and microbial systems of circulation (Elbe, 2007). Borrowing from 
work on the ways in which urban features can be viewed as surfaces for the 
materialization and circulation of financial value (Sassen, 2000; Simone, 2011), 
research within this area must ask what, for biosecurity, are the significant 
surfaces to which the circulation of financial, but also cultural and political value, 
attaches. By highlighting two possible surfaces of and for research, I hope to 
draw attention to this comparatively under investigated area of biosecurity 
research. These are, firstly, host bodies, and so, for example, the political 
economic processes that are driving the intensification of agriculture and rapid 
movement of animals; and secondly the viruses/microbes/pests themselves. 
A focus on host bodies as a surface for the circulation of value integrates 
attention to the political economies of agribusiness and global finance with viral 
ecology, as disease becomes the fallout of concern for multinational profitability. 
Wallace (2009), in considering the story of the bird flu virus H5N1, explores the 
viral opportunity structure of liberalized economies in regions of the world 
where unregulated agribusiness is pressed against peri-urban slum 
development. This provides viruses with enhanced evolutionary options in terms 
of transmission, virulence, and diversity. Rather than disease as something 
circulating through agricultural environments – a threat from the outside for 
which we need barriers to protect against – it is the circulation of capital which 
attaches to animal bodies that generates the conditions for disease emergence 
within intensive agriculture. This occurs through the production of highly 
pressurised vulnerable animal bodies redesigned, packed together and speeded 
up in response to market forces (Hinchliffe, 2013; Hinchliffe et. al, 2013). These 
vulnerable animal bodies themselves undertake extraordinary national and 
international movements both before and after slaughter. In the case of the UK’s 
2001 FMD epidemic John Law (2006) traced how 10 initially infected animals 
crossed paths with 24,500 others, in a system influenced by large scale abattoir 
closures, the CAP system of quotas, and the wider economies of the livestock 
industry. Exploitative commodity production chains of neoliberal globalisation 
therefore produce both global bio-insecurity and local labour insecurity; 
environmental bads and bad food; and emerge as the most fertile breeding 
grounds for pathogens and pathogenic inequality (Wallace, 2009; Sparke and 
Anguelov, 2012).  
If we look to microbes/viruses/pests as surfaces for capital accumulation and 
circulation, then what we are witnessing with biosecurity is the financialisation 
of emergent, unwanted life; not just in ways that drive its circulation as an 
unintended outcome, but also by capitalizing on this circulation. This 
conceptualisation moves beyond Elbe’s (2007) discussion of how finance and 
viruses negatively impact each other, as markets become jittery in response to 
new viruses, attempts to avert negative economic factors delay responses and 
speed up viral spread, or international political-economic factors constrain 
states’ responses. There is a rich area of work to be built upon focusing on 
developments in biomedicine and the life sciences, which considers how medical 
and technological advances have opened new circuits of capital producing 
bioeconomic accounts of life in which we are understood as both molecularized 
and financialized beings (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2008; Rose, 2007). Invasive 
species, viruses and microbes can no longer be seen simply as posing problems 
for capital accumulation and circulation as ‘incalculable, invaluable, and opaque’ 
entities that threaten to halt financial circulations (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 
2009). They also enable other capital flows. In many ways they are a perfect 
surface for capital accumulation and the epitome of neo-liberal values. By 
removing problems of scale, flowing easily across territorial boundaries and 
trade barriers, and, through the ever-generative rationalities of anticipatory 
action, enjoying a constant and limitless captive market, they might well be 
regarded as the ideal commodity. 
We need to concentrate research attention on the implications of these financial 
circulations for biosecurity, and the precise and differing nature of the 
intersection between biosecurity and neoliberalisation in specific contexts. 
There are those related to pharmaceutical companies through the production of 
antivirals and vaccines - something that has come under scrutiny both through 
Indonesia’s exertion of viral sovereignty by refusing to freely share its viruses 
whilst being locked out of the distribution of resulting vaccines or profits - and 
through accusations of the undue influence of these firms on the global political 
community’s response to H1N1. There are the private surveillance firms selling 
services and new technologies to public agencies, pest eradication firms pushing 
pesticides or undertaking contractual work, and viruses translated into mobile 
and fluid networks of information that can be owned, bought and sold as 
intellectual property. A host of different companies have responded to the 
problematisation of viral acceleration and the constructed technocratic response 
through the logic of financial profit. While cost sharing for biosecurity has 
become a central question for governments grappling with the balance between 
public good and private industry responsibility, profit sharing also requires 
critical attention. 
 
Conclusions  
In exploring four different modes of circulation significant for biosecurity – of 
trade and travel, microbes, information and capital – circulation itself has 
(e)merged as a space of security and form of power; a life-generative force; an 
informatic projection; and an opportunity for capital accumulation.  This is by no 
means an exhaustive account, neglecting other circulations that jostle for 
significance in a biosecurity worldview. Not least are the geological circulations, 
which, in concert with a mobile inhuman host of flora and fauna, produce a 
collaborative form of globalization ‘from below’ against which any attempts at 
‘biosecurity’ can only be viewed with modesty and humility (Clark, 2012). 
Additionally, the ways in which biosecurity governance approaches (e.g. 
neoliberal cost-sharing), interventions and practices (e.g. risk assessment 
procedures, public awareness campaigns, diagnostic kits) are mobilised and 
mutate from one governing context to the next through ideas of ‘best practice’, 
the sharing or sale of expertise and technology, underpinned by the demands of 
international protocols, is crying out for research attention. Biosecurity policy as 
a case study not only offers the possibility of a neat metaphor - the circulation of 
policy on the securitisation of circulation - to the existing rich literature on policy 
mobilities. The materiality of different environmental governing contexts and the 
disruptive agency of spatially displaced non-humans extends concerns over the 
adaptation of policy into different socio-cultural and political contexts in 
generative ways. 
Biosecurity as an empirical field has become a site through which different 
theoretical approaches circulate, entangle and recombine, revealing that the 
complexity of securing the processes that are elaborating new forms of life 
cannot be fully captured through any one theoretical lens. Just as epidemics and 
invasive events act like tracer dye in the networks of global connectivity, 
demonstrating connections through circulations of biological, technological, 
cultural and political matter, the issue area of biosecurity has traced linkages 
between what can sometimes appear as theoretical silos. This has required the 
troubling of spatial assumptions and understandings of both borders and 
circulations, as borders are deterritorialised and circulate, and as circulations 
are ‘walled in’ reinforcing a logic of closure, of inside and outside.  
Our theoretical accounts of biosecurity have perhaps reached a moment of 
saturation. We need to bring these insights into conversation with the reimaging 
of what biosecurity could entail, by investigating how alternative bios-
securitisations can be built back into the design of public and private practices. 
Two brief examples at different scales. Mosquitoes, moths and other insects 
follow their instinctive desire for the moon, embodied in the night lights of 
tourist and fishing boats that tempt them from one island in the Galápagos 
archipelago to the next, disrupting evolutionary isolation and spreading insect-
borne diseases to vulnerable animal populations. Through the simple act of 
turning off these boat lights at a distance from shore, the hypnotic circulatory 
trace is broken. The intersection of geological and biological spatio-temporalities 
is reinstated through a techno-physical act supported by campaigning, voluntary 
agreements and social coercion. In a second example, a local council approves 
the site for a farmers market in a central urban area previously suffering as a 
fresh food desert, and offers grants for local urban agriculture initiatives. 
Residents are now able to buy, direct from the producers, organic free-range 
meat from robust breeds, reared and slaughtered within less than 25 miles.  The 
animals’ own immunological responses, the lower density of animals at the farm 
and the reduced movements from farm to fork all perform functions constraining 
the possibilities for the production and transmission of viruses. Biosecurity 
could mean drifting in a blackened boat beneath a starry sky, or sharing tasty, 
nourishing food.  
Disease events will happen. The chains of causality in the complex social and 
technological circulations that cause and spread disease are open and emergent, 
defying prediction and control (Fish et al, 2011). Finding ways of living with 
disease within these indeterminate circulatory systems is important (Bingham 
and Hinchliffe, 2008; Enticott, 2010; Mather and Marshall, 2011; Philips, 2013). 
So too is finding ways of living with biosecurity – if it can be remade to comprise 
of actions that form part of a world in which we want to live.  
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